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Abstract. In this paper, we focus on distributed systems subject to
security issues. Such systems are usually composed of two entities: a
high level user and a low level user that can both do some actions. The
security properties we consider are non-interference properties. A system
is non-interferent if the low level user cannot deduce any information by
playing its low level actions. Various notions of non-interference have
been defined in the literature, and in this paper we focus on two of
them: one trace-based property (SNNI) and another bisimulation-based
property (BSNNI).
For these properties we study the problems of synthesis of a high level
user so that the system is non-interferent. We prove that a most permis-
sive high level user can be computed when one exists.
Key words: Non-Interference, Controller Synthesis.
1 Introduction
Security in Distributed Systems. Nowadays computing environments
allow users to employ programs that are sent or fetched from different
sites to achieve their goal, either in private or in an organization. Such
programs may be run as a code to do simple calculation task or as inter-
active communicating programs doing IO operations or communications.
Sometimes they deal with secret information such as private data of a
user or as classified data of an organization. Similar situations may occur
in any computing environments where multiple users share common com-
puting resources. One of the basic concerns in such context is to ensure
programs not to leak sensitive data to a third party, either maliciously
or inadvertently. This is one of the key aspects of the security concerns,
that is often called secrecy .
Non-Interference. The information flow analysis addresses this con-
cern by clarifying conditions when a flow of information in a program
is safe (i.e. high level information never flows into low level channels).
These conditions referred to as non-interference properties, capture any
causal dependency between high level and low level behaviours. Their
characterization has appeared rapidly out of the scope of the common
safety/liveness classification of system properties considered by the sys-
tem verification community during the last twenty five years. Also, in
recent years, verification of information flow security has become an emer-
gent field of research in computer science. It can be applied to the analysis
of cryptographic protocols where numerous uniform and concise charac-
terizations of information flow security properties (e.g. confidentiality, au-
thentication, non-repudiation or anonymity) in terms of non-interference
have been proposed.
Control vs. Verification. The verification problem for a given system
S and a specification φ consists in checking whether S satisfies φ which
is often written S |= φ and referred to as the model-checking problem.
The control problem assumes the system is open i.e. we can restrict the
behaviour of S: some events in S are controllable and the others are
uncontrollable, and we can sometimes disable controllable actions. A con-
troller C for S is a mapping which gives, for any history3 ρ of the system
S, the controllable action that can be played (a controller cannot restrict
uncontrollable actions). The supervised system S × C (read “S super-
vised by C”) is composed of the subset of the behaviours of S that can
be generated using the action prescribed by C. The control problem for a
system S and a specification φ asks the following: Is there a controller C
s.t. S×C |= φ ? The associated control synthesis problem asks to compute
a witness controller C.
Controlling Non-Interference. In this paper we introduce non-inter-
ference control problems. In this setting we assume that high level actions
are controllable and low level actions are uncontrollable. Given a system
S, a type of non-interference φ ∈ {SNNI,BSNNI}, the φ-non-interference
control problem asks the following: Is there a controller C such that S×C
has the φ-non-interference property? The associated synthesis problems
ask to compute a witness controller.
Related Work & Our Contribution. [1] considers the complexity of
many non-interference verification problems but control is not consid-
ered in this paper. [2] presents a tranformation that removes timing leaks
from programs to make them non-interferent w.r.t. a bisimulation con-
dition. The transformation is decidable but this problem is still different
from that of control. Indeed, the transformation removes timing leaks
3 If the system is a finite automaton, the history is the complete run with states and
labels of the transitions.
from programs without untimed leaks, by padding with dummy instruc-
tions where needed. There is also a large body of work on the use of
static analysis techniques to enforce information flow policies. A general
overview may be found in [3]. Much of this work is behaviour based; sys-
tems are deemed to be interference-free if their trace sets, sequences of
actions labelled “high” or “low”, satisfy certain properties. Here we use
a more extensional approach, saying that a system is interference-free
if low level observers are unable to discern the presence or absence of
high level components. However a formal comparison between notions of
non-interference on programming languages and similar notions on event-
based systems is not straightforward and at the best of our knowledge, has
never been investigated. The non-interference control problem was first
considered in [4] for dense timed systems given by timed automata. The
timed non interference properties are expressed in terms of states equiv-
alence and co-simulation relations. These control problems are proved
decidable and the associated synthesis problems are computable but lead
to a non-interferent controlled system which is not necessarily the most
permissive.
In this paper, we precisely define the non-interference control prob-
lems for two types of non-interference properties: a trace-based property,
SNNI and a bisimulation-based property, BSNNI. We show that both
problems are decidable. Moreover, given a system S, we prove that a
most permissive non-interferent (sub)system of S can be computed. To
our knowledge, non-interference control problems for finite state systems
have not been considered so far.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 recalls the basics of finite au-
tomata, languages, bisimulation, and µ-calculus. Section 3 is devoted to
the definition of non-interference and known results about control prob-
lems for finite automata. Section 4 is the core of the paper and contains
the main results: control of SNNI and BSNNI. Section 5 gives the direc-
tions of future work.
2 Preliminaries
Let Σ be a finite set, ε 6∈ Σ and Σε = Σ ∪ {ε}. A word w over Σ is a
sequence of letters w = a0a1 · · · an s.t. ai ∈ Σ for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Σ
∗ is the set
of words over Σ. We denote u.v the concatenation of two words. As usual
ε is also the empty word s.t. u.ε = ε.u = u. A language is a subset of Σ∗.
Given two languages A and B over Σ, A.B is the set of words defined
A.B = {w ∈ Σ∗ |w = u.v with u ∈ A, v ∈ B}. The set of mappings from
A to B is denoted [A→ B]. Given a word w = a0a1 · · · an and L ⊆ Σ the
projection of w over L is denoted w/L.
2.1 Labeled Transition Systems
Definition 1 (Labeled Transition System). A labeled transition sys-
tem (LTS) is a tuple A = (S, s0, Σ
ε,→) where S is a set of states, s0 is
the initial state, Σ a finite alphabet of actions and →⊆ S×Σε×S is the
transition relation. We use the notation q
a
−→ q′ if (q, a, q′) ∈→. A LTS is
finite is S is finite. We let En(q) be the set of labels a s.t. (q, a, q′) ∈→
for some q′. 
A run ρ of A from s is a finite sequence of transitions ρ = q0
a1−→ q1
a2−→
· · ·
an−→ qn s.t. q0 = s and (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈→ for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We let
Runs(s,A) be the set of runs from s in A and Runs(A) = Runs(s0, A).
The trace of ρ is trace(ρ) = a0a1 · · · an. A word w ∈ Σ
∗ is generated by
A if w = trace(ρ) for some ρ ∈ Runs(A). The language generated4 by
A, L(A), is the set of words generated by A. Two transition systems A
and B are language equivalent denoted A ≈L B if L(A) = L(B) i.e. they
generate the same set of words.
Definition 2 (Product of LTS). Let A1 = (S1, s
1
0, Σ1, →) and A2 =
(S2, s
2
0, Σ2,→) be two LTS. The synchronized product of A1 and A2 is
the LTS A1 × A2 = (S, s0, Σ,→) defined by: S = S1 × S2, s0 = (s
1
0, s
2
0),
Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2 and (s1, s2)
λ
−→ (s′1, s
′
2) if for some i ∈ {1, 2} (i) either
si
λ
−→ s′i with λ ∈ Σ \ Σ2−i+1 and s
′
2−i+1 = s2−i+1 or (ii) si
λ
−→ s′i if
λ ∈ Σ1 ∩Σ2. 
2.2 Bisimulation, Restriction and Abstraction
Definition 3 (Bisimulation). Let A = (SA, s
A
0 , Σ
ε,→), B = (SB , s
B
0 ,
Σε,→) be two LTS. R ⊆ SA × SB is a bisimulation if
1. for each s ∈ SA if s
λ
−→ s′, then there is a state t ∈ SB s.t. sR t and
t
λ
−→ t′ and s′R t′;
2. for each t ∈ SB if t
λ
−→ t′, then there is a state s ∈ SA s.t. sR t and
s
λ
−→ s′ and s′R t′.
4 Notice that L(A) is prefix closed as we use LTS that have no accepting or final
states.
Two LTS A and B are strongly bisimilar if there is a bisimulation R for
A and B s.t. (sA0 , s
B
0 ) ∈ R. We write A ≈S B if A and B are strongly
bisimilar. 
Definition 4 (ε-Abstract LTS). Let A = (S, s0, Σ
ε,→) be a LTS. The
ε-abstract LTS associated with A is Aε = (S, s0, Σ,→ε) where s
u
−→ε s
′
iff there is a run s
ε∗.u.ε∗
−−−−−→ s′ in A. 
Two LTS A and B are weakly bisimilar, denoted A ≈W B, if A
ε ≈S B
ε.
The abstracted transition system hides a set of labels L ⊆ Σ:
Definition 5 (Abstracted Transition System). Given a LTS A =
(S, s0, Σ
ε,→) and L ⊆ Σ we define the LTS A/L = (S, s0, (Σ\L)
ε,→L)
where q
a
−→L q
′ ⇐⇒ q
a
−→ q′ for a ∈ Σ \L and q
ε
−→L q
′ ⇐⇒ q
a
−→ q′ for
a ∈ L ∪ {ε}. 
The restricted transition system cuts transitions labeled by the letters in
L ⊆ Σ:
Definition 6 (Restricted Transition System). Given a LTS A = (S,
s0, Σ
ε,→) and L ⊆ Σ, A \ L is the LTS (S, s0, (Σ \ L)
ε,→L) where
q
a
−→L q
′ ⇐⇒ q
a
−→ q′ for a ∈ Σε \ L. 
2.3 The Modal µ-Calculus & Characteristic Formulæ
The modal µ-calculus was introduced by Kozen [5]. It is used to specify
properties of LTS and often called the assembly language w.r.t. temporal
logics formalisms. A recent survey on the subject can be found in [6]. Let
V be a countable set of formula variables and A = (S, s0, Σ,→) be a LTS.
We consider the modal µ-calculus with formulas in positive normal form.
It is defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= tt | ff | φ1 ∧ φ2 |φ1 ∨ φ2 | [σ]φ | 〈σ〉φ | Z | µZ.φ | νZ.φ. (1)
where σ ∈ Σ, Z ∈ V and B = {tt,ff} is the set of boolean values. If φ
is generated by the previous grammar we say that φ is a µ-formula or
formula for short. A closed formula (formula for short in the sequel) of
the µ-calculus is a formula s.t. every variable is under the scope of an
operator ν or µ. As usual we agree on ∧φ∈∅φ = tt and ∨φ∈∅φ = ff. We
denote [[ϕ]]Aρ ⊆ S the interpretation of ϕ w.r.t. a LTS A and a context
ρ ∈ [V −→ 2S ]. [[ϕ]]Aρ is defined inductively by the equations of Figure 1.
For the semantics definition we use the notations:
[[Z]]Aρ = ρ(Z) [[φ ∧ ψ]]
A
ρ = [[φ]]ρ ∩ [[ψ]]
A
ρ
[[¬φ]]Aρ = S \ [[φ]]
A
ρ [[φ ∨ ψ]]
A
ρ = [[φ]]ρ ∪ [[ψ]]
A
ρ
[[〈σ〉φ]]Aρ = [[〈σ〉]]
A([[φ]]Aρ ) [[νZ.φ]]
A
ρ =
S
{ξ ⊆ S : ξ ⊆ [[φ]]Aρ[Z 7→ξ]}
[[[σ]φ]]Aρ = [[[σ]]]
A([[φ]]Aρ ) [[µZ.φ]]
A
ρ =
T
{ξ ⊆ S : [[φ]]Aρ[Z 7→ξ] ⊆ ξ}
Fig. 1. Semantics of the modal µ-calculus
– let Z ∈ V and ρ be a context, ξ ∈ 2S , ρ[Z 7→ ξ] is the context defined
by ρ[Z 7→ ξ](X) = ρ(X) if X 6= Z and ρ[Z 7→ ξ](Z) = ξ;
– given σ ∈ Σ, [[[σ]]]A and [[〈σ〉]]A ∈ [2S −→ 2S ] are the predicate
transformers defined as follows:
[[[σ]]]A(X) = {s ∈ S : ∀s′ s.t. s
σ
−→ s′ then s′ ∈ X}
[[〈σ〉]]A(X) = {s ∈ S : ∃s′ s.t. s
σ
−→ s′ and s′ ∈ X}.
For a closed formula φ, one has that [[φ]]Aρ = [[φ]]
A
ρ′ , for any contexts
ρ, ρ′. In this case, we simply use [[φ]]A. We define the satisfaction relation
|= by: A, s |= φ if and only if s ∈ [[φ]]A. If A, s0 |= φ, we say that A is a
model of φ, in short A |= φ.
Definition 7. Let A = (S, s0, Σ,→) be a LTS. A formula φ s.t. A |=
φ is a characteristic formula of A up to strong bisimulation (or simply
characteristic formula of A) if for any LTS B, A ≈S B iff B |= φ. 
Let A = (S, s0, Σ,→). A characteristic formula CF(A) of A is given by
the system of equations [7, 8] for each q ∈ S:
Xq =
∧
a,q′, q
a
−→q′
〈a〉Xq′ ∧
∧
a∈Σ
[a]
( ∨
q′∈Q,q
a
−→q′
Xq′
)
By definition of CF(A) we have:
Lemma 1. A ≈S B ⇐⇒ B |= CF(A).
3 Control and Non-Interference
3.1 Control Problems
Let A = (S, s0, Σ,→) be a LTS s.t. the set of actions is partitioned into
Σu (uncontrollable actions) and Σc (controllable actions). In this case we
say A is a Game LTS (GLTS).
Definition 8 (Controller). A controller for A is a (possibly infinite)
LTS C = (Q, q0, Σ,→) which is complete w.r.t. Σu: ∀q ∈ Q,∀u ∈ Σu,
there is some q′ ∈ Q s.t. (q, u, q′) ∈→. 
Supervisory Control Problem [9, 10]. Given a language L, the prefix
closure of L, denoted L is the set of prefixes of words in L. L is a closed
language if L = L. Let A be a GLTS and ∅ ⊂ K ⊆ L(A) be a closed
language. K is controllable w.r.t. (L(A), Σu) if K.Σu ∩ L(A) ⊆ K.
The supervisory control problem (SCP) asks the following: given A
and K, is there a controller C s.t. L(C ×A) = K ?
One result in [9, 10] is that such a controller exists iff K is control-
lable. In case K is not controllable, one can compute the largest language
included in K that is controllable: it is called the supremal controllable
sub-language of K. This problem is referred to as the supremal control-
lable sub-language problem:
Compute the supremal controllable sub-language of K. (SCSLP)
Let sup(A,K) be the supremal controllable sub-language. By defini-
tion any controllable language for A is a subset of sup(A,K).
Assume K is a language given by a deterministic finite automaton
AK . Computing sup(A,K) can be done in polynomial time in the size of
A and AK . In case sup(A,K) 6= ∅ we can even obtain the most liberal
controller C s.t. L(C × A) = sup(A,K) in polynomial time. C can be
represented by a finite state automaton: one can prove (e.g [9–11]) that
C is a memoryless5 controller for the GLTS A× A¯K where A¯K generates
the complement language of K. Hence the most liberal controller C is a
finite memory6 controller that has size at most |A| · |A¯K |.
µ-Calculus Control Problem [12, 13]. Given a LTS A, a closed µ-
formula ϕ, the µ-control problem (µ-CP) is the following:
Is there a (non trivial) controller C such that C ×A |= ϕ ? (µ-CP)
The actual control problem we want to solve is to compute a non triv-
ial controller i.e. one that does not disable every action. This problem
has been proved to be solvable in [12, 13]. An algorithm to solve µ-CP
and compute the most permissive controller is given [12]: 1) first con-
struct a modal-loop formula7 ϕ(A) which is a quotient automaton of ϕ
by A s.t. P |= ϕ(A) iff P × A |= ϕ; 2) transform ϕ(A) into a non deter-
ministic loop automaton and synthesize a controller for this automaton.
5 C is a memoryless controller for A if C can be described using the states of A: the
controllable events that are allowed after a particular sequence of events depend
only on the state that is reached in A after reading this sequence of events.
6 C may need more states than the one of A and in this sense it has finite memory.
7 Modal-loop formulas are µ-formulas extended with a modality to check loops.
This transformation into an automaton may cause an exponential blow-
up and the complexity of the µ-CP depends on many parameters. The
exact complexity of µ-CP is not yet known nevertheless a finite memory
most permissive controller can be synthesized if A is controllable w.r.t.
ϕ.
3.2 Non-Interference Problems
The strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) property has been
first proposed by Focardi [14] as a trace-based generalization of non-inter-
ference for concurrent systems. Let A = (S, s0, Σ,→) be a GLTS, s.t
Σ = Σu ∪Σc: Σu (resp. Σc) is the set of public (resp. private) actions.
Definition 9 (SNNI). A has the strong non-deterministic non-interfe-
rence (SNNI) property if and only if A/Σc ≈L A\Σc. 
The SNNI verification problem (SNNI-VP) is the following: given a GLTS
A with Σ = Σu ∪ Σc, decide whether A has the SNNI property. The
problem of establishing language equivalence of non-deterministic finite
automata is reducible in polynomial time to the problem of checking
trace equivalence. Such a problem is known to be PSPACE-complete.
Also, SNNI-VP is in PSPACE as well [14].
Example 1 (SNNI). Figure 2(a) gives an example of a system that has not
the SNNI property. The high level (controllable) actions are Σc = {h1, h2}
and the low level (uncontrollable) actions are Σu = {l1, l2}. l2 is a trace
of A/Σc but not of A\Σc and A does not have the SNNI property. If we
consider A without the action h2, l2 (no states 4 and 5) then A satisfies
the SNNI property. 
0 1 2
3 4 5
h1 l1
l1
h2
l2
(a) The automaton A
0 1
h1
l1, l2 l1, l2
h1, h2
(b) The Most Liberal Controller for A
Fig. 2. Automaton and Controller
We now give the bisimulation-based definition of strong non-deterministic
non-interference proposed in [14]. Actually, any bisimulation-based infor-
mation flow property presented in [14] could be recast in a similar manner.
Definition 10 (Bisimulation-based SNNI). A has the bisimulation-
based strong non-deterministic non-interference (BSNNI) property if and
only if A/Σc ≈W A\Σc. 
The BSNNI verification problem (BSNNI-VP) is the following: given a
GLTS A with Σ = Σu ∪ Σc, decide whether A has the BSNNI property.
The problem is known to be polynomial time [14] in the size of the ǫ-
abstract automaton Aǫ.
4 Control of Non-Interference
The previous non interference problems (SSNI-VP, BSNNI-VP) consist in
checking whether a GLTS has the non-interference property. In case the
answer is “no” one has to investigate why the non-interference property
does not hold, modify A and check again the property again. In contrast
to the verification problem, the control problem indicates whether there is
a way of restricting the behaviour of the high level user to ensure a given
property. It is interesting because we can start with a very permissive
high level user and then check whether its behaviour can be restricted
by a controller to ensure a non-interference property. The SNNI-Control
Problem (SNNI-CP) is the following: given a GLTS A with Σc ∪Σu,
Is there a controller C s.t. (C ×A)/Σc ≈L (C ×A)\Σc? (SNNI-CP)
As stated previously, we are interested in non trivial controllers i.e. those
that do not disable every action (which is always a solution). In the se-
quel we show that we can compute the most liberal controller: if the most
liberal controller disables every action then there is no non trivial con-
troller and otherwise we obtain all the possible non trivial controllers. The
SNNI-Control Synthesis Problem (SNNI-CSP) asks to compute a witness
when the answer to the SNNI-CP is “yes”. The BSNNI-CP is defined in
the obvious manner: given a GLTS A with Σc ∪Σu,
Is there a controller C s.t. (C ×A)/Σc ≈W (C ×A)\Σc? (BSNNI-CP)
Again the synthesis problem associated with the BSNNI-CP asks to com-
pute a witness when the answer to the BSNNI-CP is “yes”. In the sequel
we show how to solve Problems SNNI-CP and BSNNI-CP.
4.1 SNNI Control Problem
We reduce the SNNI-CP to the supervisory control problem. Let U be an
automaton that accepts Σ∗c . We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2.
(C ×A)/Σc ≈L (C ×A)\Σc ⇐⇒ L(C ×A) ⊆ L(A\Σc × U) ∩ L(A).
Proof. By definition, (C×A)/Σc ≈L (C×A)\Σc ⇐⇒ L((C×A)/Σc) =
L((C×A)\Σc). First notice that L((C×A)\Σc) = L(A\Σc). Indeed, any
controller C for A cannot prevent uncontrollable actions from occurring.
Moreover, a controller can only restrict the set of controllable actions from
any state s and thus (C×A)\Σc is just the LTS A where all the branches
following a Σc action have been pruned. Notice also that L((C×A)\Σc) ⊆
L((C ×A)/Σc). Using the previous two equations, we obtain:
(C ×A)/Σc ≈L (C ×A)\Σc ⇐⇒ L((C ×A)/Σc) ⊆ L(A\Σc)
Moreover we can also prove that for any controller C for A:
(i)L((C×A)/Σc) ⊆ L(A\Σc) ⇐⇒ (ii)L(C×A) ⊆ L(A\Σc×U)∩L(A)
Assume (i) holds. Let w ∈ L(C × A). Then w/Σc ∈ L(C × A)/Σc =
L((C×A)/Σc). By (i), w/Σc ∈ L(A\Σc). Then w must be equal to w/Σc
in which some Σc actions are inserted, which is exactly the definition of
L(A\Σc × U). As L(C × A) ⊆ L(A), this entails L(C × A) ⊆ L(A\Σc ×
U)∩L(A). Assume (ii) holds. Let w ∈ L((C×A)/Σc). By definition there
is some w′ ∈ L(C × A) s.t. w = w′/Σc. By (ii) w
′ ∈ L(A\Σc × U). This
entails w ∈ L(A\Σc). ⊓⊔
This enables us to reduce the SNNI-CP to SCSLP:
Theorem 1. The SNNI-CSP is in EXPTIME.
Proof. The SNNI-CP asks whether there exists a controller C s.t. (C ×
A)/Σc ≈L (C×A)\Σc. Using Lemma 2, this problem amounts to finding
a controller C s.t. L(C × A) ⊆ L(A\Σc × U) ∩ L(A). Thus we just need
to solve an instance of the SCSLP with K = L(A\Σc × U) ∩ L(A). The
right-hand side of this equation is a fixed (closed) language K that can
be generated by a deterministic automaton AK . Notice that as A may
be non deterministic, this automaton has size at most exponential in
the size of A. As stated in section 3.1, we can compute the most liberal
controller s.t. C s.t. (C × A)/Σc ≈L (C × A)\Σc and moreover C is a
finite memory controller of exponential size in the size of A. Indeed, C
is a memoryless controller for a game A × A¯K where A¯K generates the
complement language ofK. Notice that if A is deterministic the algorithm
becomes polynomial because no determinization step is needed. ⊓⊔
A consequence of Theorem 1 is that SNNI-VP can be solved by our algo-
rithm: to solve SNNI-VP, we compute the most liberal controller C and
then check that for each state (s, p) of A× A¯K we have En(s, p) = En(s)
i.e. the most liberal controller does not prevent any of the high level
actions.
Example 2 (Control of SNNI). We use the automaton of Figure 2(a) (ex-
ample 1) to show how to synthesize a controller that ensures SNNI. We
recall that Σc = {h1, h2} and Σu = {l1, l2}. First we have L(A) =
{h1.l1, l1, h2.l2}, L(A\Σc×U) = Σ
∗
c .l1.Σ
∗
c , and thus L(A)∩L(A\Σc×U) =
{h.l1, l1}.
We can use standard controller synthesis procedures8 (see e.g. [11])
to compute the most liberal controller. This is a controller that avoids
states {4, 5} in A and thus prevents h2. The subsystem of A obtained by
removing h2 is the maximal subsystem that has the SNNI property and
the most liberal controller C is given on Figure 2(b). 
4.2 BSNNI Control Problem
We can define a satisfaction relation |=ε that considers the ε action as
the invisible action and extend our interpretation of µ-calculus formulas
over LTS containing ε by: A |=ǫ φ ⇐⇒ A
ǫ |= φ. If L ⊆ Σε, we define
the following “macro” operators for the µ-calculus:
[L]ϕ
def
= ∧b∈L[b]ϕ 〈L〉ϕ
def
= ∨b∈L〈b〉ϕ
〈L∗〉ϕ
def
= µX.(ϕ ∨ 〈L〉X) [L∗]ϕ
def
= νX.(ϕ ∧ [L]X)
The translation κL(ϕ) of a µ-formula ϕ w.r.t. L ⊆ Σ
ε is inductively given
by:
κL(Z) = Z κL(¬ϕ) = ¬κL(ϕ)
κL(φ ∧ ψ) = κL(φ) ∧ κL(ψ) κL(φ ∨ ψ) = κL(φ) ∨ κL(ψ)
κL([σ]ϕ) = [L
∗][σ][L∗]κL(ϕ) κL(〈σ〉ϕ) = 〈L
∗〉〈σ〉〈L∗〉κL(ϕ)
κL(νZ.φ) = νZ.κL(ϕ) κL(µZ.φ) = µZ.κL(ϕ)
8 This generates state based memoryless controllers which generates the supremal
controllable sub-language of A w.r.t. L(A) ∩ L(A\Σc × U).
Lemma 3. Let L ⊆ Σ. Then A/L |=ε ϕ ⇐⇒ A |= κL(ϕ).
Proof. It follows directly from Definitions (5) and (4) and |=ε. ⊓⊔
Example 3. Let A to be the automaton of Figure 2(a) (example 1). We
recall that Σc = {h1, h2} and Σu = {l1, l2}. CF (A\Σc) is defined by the
following equation system:
X0 = 〈l1〉X3 ∧ [l1]X3 ∧ [l2]ff
X3 = [l1]ff ∧ [l2]ff
and κΣc(CF (A)) is defined by the following equation system:
X0 = 〈Σ
∗
c 〉〈l1〉〈Σ
∗
c 〉X3 ∧ [Σ
∗
c ][l1][Σ
∗
c ]X3 ∧ [Σ
∗
c ][l2][Σ
∗
c ]ff
X3 = [Σ
∗
c ][l1][Σ
∗
c ]ff ∧ [Σ
∗
c ][l2][Σ
∗
c ]ff 
Moreover we can relate weak bisimulation, hiding and satisfiability of a
characteristic formula:
Lemma 4. Assume B is an automaton with no ε transitions and L ⊆ Σ.
Then A/L ≈W B ⇐⇒ A |= κL(CF(B)).
Proof.
A/L ≈W B ⇐⇒ (A/L)
ε ≈S B [by definition of ≈W ]
⇐⇒ (A/L)ε |= CF(B) [by Lemma 1]
⇐⇒ A/L |=ε CF(B) [by definition of |=ε]
⇐⇒ A |= κL(CF(B)) [by Lemma 3] ⊓⊔
Using the previous lemmas and the characteristic formula CF(A) of a
LTS, we can reduce the BSNNI-CP to a µ-CP:
Theorem 2. BSNNI-CP is decidable and if the answer to the BSNNI-
CP is “yes” a most permissive controller can be effecively synthesized i.e.
BSNNI-CSP is computable.
Proof. The BSNNI-CP is the following (Cf. equation (BSNNI-CP)):
Is there any controller C for A s.t. (C ×A)/Σc ≈W (C ×A)\Σc?
As C does not restrict the uncontrollable actions, we have again that
(C×A)\Σc = A\Σc. We can then compute the characteristic formula for
A\Σc and obtain CF(A\Σc). Applying Lemma 4 we obtain:
(C ×A)/Σc ≈W (C ×A)\Σc ⇐⇒ (C ×A)/Σc ≈W A\Σc
⇐⇒ (C ×A) |= κΣc(CF(A\Σc))
This enables us to reduce the BSNNI-CP to the following µ-CP:
∃C s.t. C ×A |= κΣc(CF(A\Σc))
We have now a µ-CP to solve of the form ∃C s.t. C × A |= ϕ with ϕ a
µ-calculus formula. This can be done as stated in [12, 13]. If A is control-
lable w.r.t. κΣc(CF(A\Σc)) we can build a finite memory most permissive
controller that satisfies BSNNI. ⊓⊔
As stated in section 3 the complexity of µ-CP is not yet known and thus
we cannot obtain complexity result with our reduction.
Example 4 (Control of BSNNI). We use the automaton of Figure 2(a)
(example 1) to show how to synthesize a controller that ensures BSNNI.
There are four possibilities for the most permissive controller C: either it
allows {h1, h2} or {h1} or {h2} or nothing. If it allows h2, the initial state
of A × C does not satisfy [Σ∗c ][l2][Σ
∗
c ]ff in X0 because after h2 an action
l2 is enabled which is forbidden by κΣc(CF (A\Σc)). If it allows l1, A×C
satisfies κΣc(CF (A\Σc)) and thus the most permissive controller is the
one given by Figure 2(b) again. 
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have defined the control problems SNNI-CP and BSNNI-
CP for the two types of non-interference properties SNNI and BSNNI. We
have proved that SNNI-CP and BSNNI-CP are decidable and we solved
both associated control synthesis problems i.e. given a system S, compute
the most permissive non-interferent (sub)system of S. Our future work
will consist in:
– extending our result to other types of non-interference (e.g TSNNI,
PBNDC or BNDC . . . );
– finding the exact complexity of both SNNI-CP and BSNNI-CP;
– implementing our framework. For SNNI there is BDD based tool [15]
to solve the supervisory control problem. Concerning BSNNI and the
µ-CP, the tool Synthesis [16] implements the theoretical setting of [12].
This would enable us to apply our results to reasonable size problems.
– extending our results to timed systems and timed non-interference to
generalize and refine the results of [4].
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